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Abstract
Microeconomic theory generally supports the idea of an inverse relationship between
taxes and capital investment. The gaming industry however does not operate on a free market
equilibrium of supply and demand. Regulation and taxation of this industry can distort
competitive forces and, as a result, investment decisions. Forces are described herein which
either strengthen or weaken this inverse relationship, as well as how they affect the value of the
limited number of casino operating licenses which states grant. Higher tax rates are generally
shown to result in small-scale properties, which cater to a narrow base of consumers. In contrast,
low tax rates are shown to allow operators the flexibility to grow their consumer base, and create
broader economic benefits.
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Part 1:Introduction
Casino saturation has become one of the paramount issues facing the gaming industry.
As an article in the New Yorker recently noted:
Atlantic City once had the densely populated Northeast all to itself, but now nearly every
state in the region is home to casinos. And with both New York and Massachusetts
poised to open massive new gambling resorts, the competition for the fixed number of
gamblers there will only get tougher (Wolfson, 2014).
As a result, only eight casinos remain open in Atlantic City where there once were
twelve, and together they earn half the gaming revenue of the Atlantic City casinos ten years ago.
The city now urgently faces a need to diversify, as being a site of legal gambling is no longer a
distinction of its own (Wolfson, 2014).
Any new investment in Atlantic City is now for the purpose of diversifying its array of
attractions. Harrah’s is constructing a new conference center, which it expects to attract groups
that may otherwise host their events in other Northeastern markets (Kramer, 2015). The Atlantic
City Convention Center, meanwhile is renovating its fixtures, and opening a new ballroom
(Wittkowski, 2015).
Casino corporations with flagship resorts on the Las Vegas Strip, such as Wynn, MGM,
and Sands, are realizing the limits of their growth in this traditional market. While they see
revenues there recovering as the recession has abated, Macau has offered access to a much larger
market of gamblers with increasing disposable income. While, in the U.S., these companies have
aggressively bid for licenses in the high net worth metropolitan markets of Boston and
Washington, D.C. These new jurisdictions are the last frontier for the long taken for-granted
growth of resort style gambling (Forbes, 2015).

This paper considers the possibility of improved partnerships between state governments
and their casinos to lower tax rates and reform those regulations, which make taxes more
impactful on any potential returns. If structured properly, this would encourage the necessary
capital investment to help gaming reach a broader market. The report will examine the impacts
of gaming tax rates, but will also analyze them in the context of broader regulation and
competitive pressures. For example, if low tax rates are helpful, then Atlantic City, with the
second-lowest rate in the U.S., should be doing better in its economic performance. Reno is
hurting from competition, but Las Vegas, in the same state, shares the same low tax rate, and
continues to prosper.
If cannibalization is a concern, then do high tax rates discourage investment by limiting
the size of markets, as well as by lowering the returns on investment? Could there be greater
competition along with a growing market if there were more capital left to appeal to a wider base
of customers?
Policy goals shape regulation from the outset. If increased investment is the goal, then tax
rates would necessarily be pressured to be lowered, thereby encouraging investment, which in
turn leads to the results of increased employment and tourism, as well as other potential public
policy benefits.
If the policy goal is to capture tax revenue directly from gaming (a scenario in which
policymakers view gaming as a pain-free source of tax revenue), then those taxes are likely to be
above the optimal rate, and result in smaller-scale properties (Pollock, 2010). However, this
second goal becomes increasingly counterproductive as competition intensifies across markets,
necessitating greater spending on promotional marketing as well as on transportation
infrastructure.
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These dilemmas, resulting from both market and regulatory pressures, require operators
to consider the following factors when deciding on capital investment decisions:
o Internal rate of return
o Competitive pressures from within the market
o Opportunities to expand demographically or geographically
o Regulatory stability
o Limitations on number of licenses
Operators will also have to consider the following questions:
o What role does the tax on gross gaming revenue (GGR) play in investment decisions?
o Does the tax on GGR determine and/or limit the type of business model that an operator is
likely to develop?
o What is the effect of the casino tax rate on capital investment decisions?
In order to isolate for the effects of taxation, this paper only examines markets, which
have either opened legal casinos or meaningfully changed their gaming tax rates within the
past ten years. Competition between jurisdictions to capture legal gambling activity, and the
economic benefits, which generally ensue is only a recent phenomenon. Therefore, the two
oldest gaming jurisdictions, New Jersey and Nevada, are less relevant to this discussion in
how they had developed their current laws, but rather in whether their low tax rates can be
leveraged going forward to sustain their industries in the face of increased competition from
newer jurisdictions. The literature review reflects the limited scope of research on this
industry, with most jurisdictions having only legalized casino gambling within the past few
decades, and with a few notable academics having gained credibility in this field.
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Part 2: Literature Review
As gaming markets face greater competition, both the competition between markets for
new investment, as well as the need to grow consumer demand, become more urgent.
Governments historically have placed great demands on casino operators, since it was assumed
that such potential operators would tolerate any regulation, with legal casinos being both
uncommon and potentially profitable, which would grant operators nearly exclusive access to a
new consumer market wherever they operated.
Governments expected management to concede to whatever demands they deemed
necessary to protect the fabric of society and collect the maximum possible revenue. However,
with limited supply and government-mandated market protection, this meant that casinos
acceded to these demands so that these licensed operators could provide gaming to a then greatly
underserved population (Christiansen, 1998).
Still, today, casinos remain likely to accede to greater tax rates if they are guaranteed an
oligopoly privilege in return (Benar & Jenkins, 2008). These premium rates in effect afford
casinos insulation from competition they would not otherwise have. This privilege can in fact be
magnified if the approved site is located next to a densely populated metropolitan area. Cities in
general can in fact demand greater taxes than their rural counterparts, since such locations offer
concentrated local consumer demand, and greater economic activity to be captured (Kächelein,
2014).
Consumers will more likely take part in legal gambling closer to home with all else being
equal. If there are only a few legal options within driving range, these repeat-visit market
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casinos may only offer the bare minimum of amenities. Therefore, these sorts of establishments
will attract only the most heavily involved of gamblers (Eadington & Christiansen, 2007).
If these establishments wish to draw from a broader market of entertainment seekers, they
will then have to invest in a broader range of amenities. Furthermore, they will have to invest
more in marketing and promotions to attract less-involved gamblers, as well as those travelling
from a greater distance. The tax rate governments choose will additionally determine just how
well companies can invest in capacity. If the goal of legalizing casinos is to gain greater tax
revenue, then having few casinos, which only meet the demands of the most heavily involved of
gamblers will not yield meaningful results. Tax revenue at lower rates may exceed that at higher
rates as casino revenue grows (Spectrum Gaming Group, 2014), when tax revenue from all
sources – not just the tax on GGR – is considered.
Also, when markets open in close competition with each other, the market with the higher
tax rate will likely lose out to the others, which are more accommodating of management goals.
The market with the higher rate will likely attract casinos that only meet the demands of a
convenience market. The market with the lower rate will be better positioned to host destination
resorts, which draw from a greater geographic area and therefore draw greater economic activity
as well as tax revenue. Of course, this dynamic is most relevant in the US where gaming is
regulated and licensed at the state level, meaning that neighboring states determine their own
rules regarding casinos.
Tax Rate and Capital Investment
Research into the relationship between taxes, investment, and consumption is hardly a
new endeavor. Although tax rate decisions by governments and investment decisions by
corporations, each with their own rivals, is a more current and directly relevant topic. The
5

increasing ease with which firms can reach consumers worldwide, who make rational cost-based
decisions, has created the current dynamic in which governments see the results of their policies,
and realize each other’s externalities, social and otherwise, more immediately (Klick & Parisi,
2005). Tax rates do determine market activity, and hence decisions to allocate capital, however
much in proportion to other economic variables including consumer demand, as is explained in
the following sections.
Relevance of jurisdiction size
As the following studies show, a jurisdiction’s natural advantages as far as size,
population, and retention of production factors, can offer it greater discretion in setting tax rates.
These studies have all lead to similar conclusions about tax rates imposed by large jurisdictions
exploiting consumer demand, while supply is drawn to more investment-hungry small
jurisdictions (Leal et al., 2010). The relatively recent surge in globalization, along with
liberalizing of trade and mobility of capital, has since the 1990s made a state’s power to tax a
more compelling topic of study.
In a survey of studies, Bartik (1992) found that smaller, less populated jurisdictions can
capture more economic benefits, per capita, from low corporate taxes. This is assuming,
however, that there is a large enough gap to account for any inbuilt advantages or difference in
an area’s per-capita income.
Bartik (1992) also cautions that the lowering of corporate taxes shouldn’t come at the
expense of spending on public infrastructure, since there is a correlation between sound
infrastructure, especially that used for transportation, and new investment. Also, there has to be
easy substitutability between potential investment sites, for this effect to be relevant (Bartik,
1992).
6

Modeling for tax competition, with supply and demand being respectively sought after as
they were, Kanbur and Keen (1993) found that small and large countries in competition with
each other are often left desiring the other’s attributes. While the large country has a
geographically captive market on which to set higher rates, it also may have residents wealthy
enough to tolerate those rates, while being protected by the high transaction costs of crossing into
the low-tax jurisdiction. The smaller country however, has a smaller base from which to capture
tax revenue, even while it may draw consumer traffic from its larger neighbor. The small country
advantage can be maintained only though a difference in rates. Rate cuts by the larger
jurisdiction would leave both governments lacking sufficient funds. Equality in rates would
greatly harm the small jurisdiction, as its competitive advantage would be lost (Kanbur & Keen,
1993).
Modeling for geographic variables, Kächelein (2014) found that large jurisdictions, as
well as those where all the necessary inputs for investment are located, can charge higher tax
rates. While labor today is mobile, market, legal, and geographic conditions, those necessary for
investment when specific inputs are needed, are not easily transferable or substitutable
(Kächelein, 2014). Therefore, firms subject to such rigid geographic conditions must have a
greater tolerance for high tax rates.
In modeling for elasticity of a taxable activity, Klick and Parisi (2005) found that a tax
authority with broad jurisdiction can more easily set rates that fund the optimal amount of public
services, while allowing for desired business activity. In contrast, they found that jurisdictions
competing under a federal or state government may tax above optimal rates in order to capture
scarce revenue. The externalities of such behavior may then not even be realized within that
jurisdiction, affecting employment and investment more broadly, potentially a moral hazard
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(Klick & Parisi, 2005). Therefore, federal jurisdictions require firms to account for greater risk of
rising tax rates.
Negotiating differences in tax rates
Firms generally can be expected to consider any differences in tax rates between
competing jurisdictions while managing their operations, which allow for the greatest retention
of profits, as long as they can maintain access to their respective markets. Likewise, consumers
will traverse jurisdictions in order to pay lower sales taxes.
Leal, López-Laborda, and Rodrigo (2010) found, in a survey of literature, that theories of
cross-border shopping only hold for as much as the greater transaction costs involved don’t
outweigh the tax savings. Furthermore, they found that small jurisdictions benefit from lower
taxes, as these lead to more business activity overall, benefitting a smaller population. They also
found that businesses located just across the border from a high-tax jurisdiction benefit most
from the rational behavior of that jurisdiction’s consumers.
Strategic reactions between rival jurisdictions have to be accounted for as the small
jurisdiction only captures economic rent from low taxes as long as there remains a gap. Still,
with the large number taxing authorities, this arbitrage becomes more complicated and less
useful for raising tax revenues (Leal et al., 2010).
An industry as scrutinized as casino gaming values the social legitimacy it gains through
compliance with rules meant to ensure the public good. This therefore limits its ability to
artificially reduce its tax burden. Loretz and Moore (2013) found, modeling for a relation
between tax sheltering and reputation loss, that large firms within the same jurisdiction are
interdependent as far as planning for and abiding by the same tax rate.
These firms value their reputations as being law-abiding corporate citizens as long as that
8

is the norm within their respective industries. The largest of these firms set the norm for
compliance, and are more influential in relevant political debates (Loretz & Moore, 2013). The
largest corporations in the gaming industry feel constant pressure to conduct corporate
responsibility initiatives including community service sponsorships, as well as to publicize their
sizable tax contributions in order to generate good will.
Economic Theory of Casino Operations
Casinos do in fact seem to be restrained by the same economic laws, which govern more
generally (Prum & Bybee, 1999). Therefore, the historic exploitation of this industry for
immediate sources of tax revenue is becoming less feasible as more jurisdictions liberalize their
gaming laws, thus adding more supply to the overall market. Individual operators may stand to
benefit from high barriers to entry in a market, as long as the privilege they’re paying for grants
them exclusive rights to a market with a sufficiently large consumer demand to offer the return
they desire.
Chistiansen (1998) described an American gambling market, which was reaching
maturity, and overcoming many classic social stigmas. He also described its acceptance as an
economically productive industry, fulfilling a market demand for entertainment, while
stimulating construction and employment. While most Americans were located within a
reasonable distance of legal gambling, whether these were casinos or racetracks, market demand
was yet to be fully met. Therefore, the tax revenue resulting from casinos was still being lauded
as a boon to society without fear, as of yet, of markets growing into closer competition
(Christiansen, 1998).
Tax rates’ impact on market growth
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Tax rates can either severely limit growth of a gaming market, or allow for the
flourishing of a tourist economy. Low rates may generally lead to economic growth in a region.
High rates may concentrate negative externalities such as problem gambling, while garnering tax
revenue more regressively than otherwise.
Pollock (2010), in his report for the National Tax Association found through his own
regression analysis and survey of other research, that gaming taxes are the key determinant of
what type of property will get built in a jurisdiction. Pollock observed gaming tax rates to
generally have an inverse relationship with the level of capital investment in a market, along with
employment, tourism, and related factors (Pollock, 2010).
Philander (2012), through a fixed-effects model, further confirmed this inverse
relationship with the dependent variable being employment levels. Nevertheless, broader
economic cycles and market conditions can have a mediating impact. If consumer spending is
low in the broader economy, then so may casino investment and therefore employment, as an
indirect result of overall market demand (Philander, 2012).
Tax rates have to be predictable and stable as well as commensurate to regional demand
in order to attract investment. Prum and Bybee (1999), through their survey of U.S. gaming
jurisdictions, suggested that changing rates appears to be as risky as setting them too high as they
factor into forecasting, and therefore decisions on new projects. Simplicity of tax formulas is also
important, as fees charged for auxiliary site functions like parking can distort the amenity mix,
and property scale, while increasing the cost of compliance. The scope of competition from
within a market as well as from neighboring states should also limit rates (Prum & Bybee, 1999).
Thompson and Stream (2005) observed legislative developments and economic outcomes
in different jurisdictions. They first posited that taxation of Native American casinos is
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unconstitutional on its face, however much the taxes are justified as fees or revenue sharing
agreements. Still, the pressure to be in compliance with their state compacts, as well as the
reward of exclusive rights within the state to operate gaming, make such concessions more
compelling for tribes. Furthermore, while taxes on gaming revenue have been relied upon to
cover state spending deficits, or for specific programs, they are not the primary revenue streams
in any state. Even in Nevada, sales taxes are the largest revenue source (Thompson & Stream,
2005). Gaming taxes however, should not be conceived of as such a fungible source of funds, as
out-of-state competition can increase, while market demand fluctuates, requiring casinos to
periodically spend capital on modifying their scale and product mix in order to remain viable.
In South Dakota, where the video lottery gaming tax is 50%, storefront video poker
predominates with relatively high house advantages, and a poorer clientele. Note however that
the tax rate for commercial casinos in that state is nine percent (American Gaming Association,
2014). This 50% tax rate incentivizes the state to regulate video lottery terminals laxly, and to
tolerate social consequences like problem gambling along with a lack of economic development.
In contrast, Las Vegas casinos benefit from the lowest gaming tax rate in the US, which
incentivizes a highly competitive environment where casino resorts benefit from a tourist
economy. Predominant features of this competition include nongaming amenities and
architectural grandeur. This creates an agglomeration effect, which further enhances the appeal
of Las Vegas as a resort destination (Thompson & Stream, 2005). Still, because of the difference
between video lottery and commercial casinos, this makes for a faulty comparison, even if the
observed effects of tax rates in each case appear valid.
Eadington and Christiansen (2007), through their qualitative observation of different
markets, found that low tax rates facilitate the development of large-scale casino resorts. These

11

resorts withstand increasing out-of-state competition by having a differentiated appeal. They also
offer a broader array of amenities, making them wider attractions. They may lead to increased
tourism, and capture more of a region’s entertainment budget. In contrast, higher rates lead
mainly to locals-friendly slot and video poker outlets, providing little more than additional tax
revenue, while concentrating social consequences of compulsive gambling closer to home. Fullscale resorts require great capital investment to build, regular maintenance every five or ten years
to maintain, and broad marketing campaigns in order to remain viable. The $8 billion
construction cost of MGM’s City Center resort in 2007 was only possible with Nevada’s
effectively less than eight percent tax rate. This sort of property only has to compete with other
similarly scaled resorts offering a wide mix of amenities. The store-front model, however, relies
to a large degree on the inelastic demand of gamblers, providing regressive sources of tax
revenue to the state (Eadington & Christiansen, 2007). This model is increasingly dated as legal
gambling in its simplest form is now available in most states.
Broader societal impact of rates
Philander and Bernhard (2013), in their survey of current research on commercial
casinos’ economic impacts, confirmed that gaming taxes are generally regressive, meaning that
there is no difference in tax rates based on income or other factors. However, this effect can be
mitigated if the tax revenue is used for such benefits as social welfare spending or public
transportation. They found that the tax revenue accrues more progressively when customers are
encouraged to travel to a resort casino, which would be more likely to offer a wider choice of
offerings, including high-denomination slots and table games. Lottery games are sold in uniform
denominations, and are more aspirational, so lower income people more often consume them,
making lottery revenue more regressive as well (Philander & Bernhard, 2013).
12

Walker and Jackson (2010) found that casino legalization could have the effect of a net
decline in government revenues, if it causes consumers to substitute spending at commercial
casinos for other more tax-lucrative spending such as on lotteries or horse racing. This indirect
impact on taxable consumption in a state introducing casino gambling is mostly relevant if it
already offers these highly taxed products. This results from a model testing revenue from a
variety of gaming products against averages state revenues and average demographic traits of all
50 states (Walker & Jackson, 2010).
Philander, Bernhard, Wimmer, Singh, & Eadington (2015) found that gaming tax rates
affect employment, only to the point of increasing scale to meet market demand. They concluded
that beyond an optimal point, lowering the tax affords operators greater profitability while only
marginally affecting employment. They formed a linear regression, using maximum gaming tax
rates, employment, and gross revenue in US jurisdictions, with the alcohol tax as a control
variable, as it is most similar in its intent and application (Philander et al., 2015).
Rationale behind rates
Even as is taught in introductory college economics, Mankiw (2012) described how
excessive deadweight loss, unrealized productivity, can occur when tax rates are set beyond a
point at which there is any incentive to produce. Politicians therefore have to be concerned with
maintaining rates at which firms will still be able to sell goods and services above their cost.
Taxes already may drive up prices to a point that only few consumers will pay. Deadweight loss,
unrealized productivity, occurs exponentially as rising prices also push supply downwards.
Taxes are effective in raising revenue as long as they do not shrink the size of a market through
deadweight loss, which prevents any benefit to society (Mankiw, 2012). The following studies
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offer perspective on how general theories of taxation and social impacts of the gaming industry
have taken shape over the past few decades.
Calcagno, Walker, and Jackson (2010) found in their modeling of socio-economic and
political variables that casino legalization is most highly correlated with long-term debt
concerns, lack of funding for new initiatives, and competition from neighboring states. States
that already prominently feature legal gambling as with racetracks, lotteries, or Indian casinos,
are less likely to approve commercial casinos, as they likely perceive consumer demand and
fiscal needs as already being met. The most likely condition for commercial casino legalization
is when Indian casinos operate in a neighboring state. Residents would rather capture economic
benefits in their home jurisdiction. Another favorable factor is a higher income population,
which may desire a new attraction, also resulting in less fear of preying on lower income groups.
Furthermore, river borders afford a perception of traditional riverboat gambling, along with that
of isolating any possible externalities on the river (Calcagno et al., 2010).
Anderson (2005) found, while examining the relationship between gaming taxes and
gaming supply, that gaming taxes are increasingly relied upon for funding social services or
economic development. Policy makers view theses taxes as essential to funding programs, which
may otherwise not be self-sustaining as part of the social safety-net, in addition to protecting
against externalities like problem gambling. Therefore, it seems these taxes are increasingly
essential to budget planning, being a less controversial source of taxation (Anderson, 2005).
Eadington (1999) described casino gambling, in his historic account, as an exportable
commodity. It allows jurisdictions without natural economic advantages to capture the
entertainment budgets of consumers in neighboring markets. Regulations designed to protect
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social welfare, and confiscatory tax rates can therefore be tolerated as long as the feeder markets
don’t eventually establish their own casinos (Eadington, 1999).
Benar and Jenkins (2008) found, modeling for efficiency of tax rates, that taxing of
casinos’ fixed assets nets more revenue for governments than does taxing of revenue. They also
found it more efficient for small jurisdictions to set higher rates on a limited number of operators
than a lower rate on an unlimited number (Benar & Jenkins, 2008).
Ozurumba and Kim (2009) observed the relationship between economic and
demographic indicators, and gaming taxes along with gaming revenues. They concluded that
states formulate gaming tax rates according to competitive pressures from other states, the per
capita income of their own residents, and consumer demand overall in the region. Most US
jurisdictions are subject to these pressures according to the degree to which legal gambling is
available nearby.
If markets are isolated and contain a wealthy population with growing consumer demand,
their governments will set rates, which reach the peak of the umbrella-shaped Laffer Curve,
which represents the relation between tax rates and tax revenue. Passing that point means tax
costs will be passed on to consumers and employees, compromising the appeal of a property, and
generating less revenue overall (Ozurumba &Kim, 2009). This will ultimately limit the possible
return on any further investment.
Cases of Specific Jurisdictions
Freeman (2014), as president of the American Gaming Association, discussed in an op-ed
how the greater competition casinos face today, even from those in other jurisdictions, requires
reform of rules formed when supply was more limited. He argues that governments should view
casinos as only one component of an economy’s potential growth. The best example in his view
15

is that of Nevada, which is now also attracting technology and energy companies (Freeman,
2014).
The following studies illustrate how the growing availability of gaming products is
affecting the competitive environment in different markets, and how appropriately current tax
rates serve fiscal and economic goals in this context. While casinos in China and in the United
States vary greatly in the types of gaming consumers they serve, and the regulations they abide
by, the same principles of market competition apply in both cases (Economist 2013). Macau’s
gaming tax rate of 38% also falls within the range of rates for most US states.
The United States
Ahlgren (2012), running a linear regression, found that the stepped increase in Illinois’
gaming tax led to distortions, which benefitted neighboring states. Illinois casinos absorbed the
new tax costs by decreasing marketing expenditures. This cost cutting was further incentivized
by increased rates as casinos reached new levels of revenue, leading them rationally to not
reinvest in marketing. Neighboring states likely captured spurned customers who thereafter did
not receive the same promotions as before the cost cutting. Value therefore has to be conveyed in
a uniform manner. Customers could sense cost cutting through the drop-off in promotion, and
then became worried of having to incur greater costs themselves, such as through parking fees.
Illinois proved particularly vulnerable to its residents driving to more promotion-friendly casinos
across state lines, as the riverboat model is in fact relegated to rivers serving as state borders
(Ahlgren, 2012).
In Spectrum Gaming Group’s (2014) report presented to the Indiana Legislature, it found
through observed trends and similar case studies that the varied taxes and fees applied flatly to
various casino functions distort development planning, and hinder growth in amenities. For
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example, the admission fees, which casinos must pay, may discourage them from building
attractions along the perimeter of the casino, which would encourage people to leave and reenter. More importantly, the taxing of free play, which allows consumers to make wagers
without having to pay for them, would discourage a primary marketing tool Indiana casinos use
to the retain the loyalty of regional customers, where most surrounding states would not have the
same obstacle. New York’s casinos, for example, were able to draw from New Jersey and
Pennsylvania’s markets, once free play was untaxed (Spectrum Gaming Group, 2014).
Walker and Nesbit (2014) found, through observing property growth and gaming mix of
casinos, during the overall growth of the Missouri market that increased competition lead to a
larger consumer market. Nevertheless, Missouri casinos are not concentrated enough to cause an
agglomeration effect, which would make a group of them an attraction in itself. Also, the
growing proportion of slot machines, with their high substitution effect, is reflective of the more
competitive market. Newer and less discerning players are more likely drawn to them as they
enter the gaming market. (Walker & Nesbit, 2014).
Garrett and Marsh (2002) found, through models of spatial dependence, in a survey of
cross-border lottery sales, that while the magnitude of jackpots overall may determine the
popularity of any particular draw, retail shopping patterns more broadly determine where
consumers will buy their lottery tickets. In the case of Kansas, the state benefitted from
Oklahoma residents without a state lottery of their own. However, Kansas’s residents have been
purchasing tickets over state lines in Nebraska and Missouri where Kansas’s residents go to work
or shop in more densely populated areas. This is despite the general similarity in products
between those states. (Garrett & Marsh, 2002)
China
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The Economist (2013) reported that Macau’s market was beginning to face similar legal
and competitive pressures as in the US, where most operators are based and must account for
their conduct in all markets. With concerns of money laundering and junkets tied to organized
crime, casinos now must attract more casual gamblers as well as feature more non-gaming
amenities. This urgency grows as Macau grows into greater competition with Singapore, while
other Asian countries also consider legalizing their own casinos (Economist 2013).
Siu (2006) found in his historic account that Macau’s protected status as the only legal
site for casino gambling in China meant that it could continue to attract capital investment, as it
could expect visitation from the rest of China (Siu, 2006).
Gu and Tam (2011) observed gaming activity and visitation patterns along with overall
GDP growth in Macau. They found in their analysis of Macau’s growth that it has depended
largely on its exclusive access to the mainland Chinese market. Additionally, the limited
competition within that region has allowed it to benefit from the inelastic demand of Chinese
consumers. Furthermore, investment in full-scale resorts attracted foreign tourists as well, while
many social externalities are born outside of Macau. Gu and Tam also suggested Macau’s tax
rate should remain the same in order to allow the government to invest further in infrastructure.
The geographic site, itself needs this spending on infrastructure, especially if operators decide to
build a greater array of attractions (Gu & Tam, 2011).
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Part 3: Conclusion
There are many variables which factor into casino capital investment decisions. Gaming
tax rates however seems to be the one factor which most influences the scale of any casino
property. Mitigating factors can include neighboring competition, as well as oligopoly privilege.
The fewer the casino operation licenses are granted, the more valuable they become. Macau
benefits most from this dynamic with its exclusive access to Mainland China, and it’s few
regional competitors. Meanwhile, Delaware (DE), Maryland (MD), and Pennsylvania (PA),
examined later in this section, border each other while offering similar products.
High tax rates can affect investment decisions, while serving as barriers to competition.
Therefore, they can result in lucrative slot parlors, which offer few social benefits, but are
effective in generating tax revenue. This is particularly true of racecourse casinos, which request
government protection along with a liberalized product offering, as horseracing, alone, loses
market appeal. Slot machines offer them incremental revenue.
Low rates offer a significant first mover advantage. They allow for construction of resorts
able to withstand competition from basic gambling products in neighboring markets.
Furthermore, broader market activity can affect consumer demand, determining the overall
regional entertainment budget to be captured.
Large corporations also have to account for their operations in several markets, deciding
where is best to allocate capital. Market factors affect how well tax rates can be tolerated, both
by affecting the size of possible returns as well as by affecting the scale of competition within a
market. A more competitive neighboring jurisdiction may negate any natural advantages of a
market. Gaming markets in MD, PA, and DE, opened contemporaneously while only marketing
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to regional customers. Scale could only be achieved through any benefits afforded by location
and protection from competition.
Such locations include major cities and resort areas. In the US, the last remaining
jurisdictions where governments can use such an advantage as leverage are metropolitan areas
where few licenses are granted, and other licenses are dispersed throughout the state.
Proposed projects for Center City Philadelphia and for across the Potomac River from
Washington DC, in the graph, serve this point. If a more competitive market allows consumers to
be more liberally marketed to, while freeing up more capital for building a grander scale
property, then this market will receive more investment as long as there remains a reasonable
proximity to a consumer market. Agglomeration, however, results from an accommodating
public policy, so this advantage would erode if governments were to compromise existing capital
investment, though more regulation and taxes.
Tax rates can be the single most important determining factor, but other variables can
affect market conditions more broadly, affecting the viability of the market, rather than just what
capital is left over for reinvestment, the possibility of returns, or the scope of competition.
The graph only accounts for taxes as an influencing factor in the markets taken as
examples, but also considers the states’ populations and median household incomes to be
mediating factors. These are, respectively, the most basic indicators of market size and consumer
demand.
This graph only accounts for the most basic variables that correlate with development of
resort style properties since those are known to have the widest economic impacts, and are best
able to withstand competition from convenience gaming markets (Eadington & Christiansen,
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2007). These resorts draw from a wider market of entertainment and leisure seekers. The most
typical of resort amenities are hotel rooms and fine dining restaurants.
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware are the three states compared, because of their
mutual borders, and their opening of gaming markets within a few years of each other. The
Northeast, while relatively prosperous and populated, is a competitive region for gaming.
Atlantic City, a summer resort, is the oldest regional market, and had traditionally drawn from
these states year-round. Maryland allowed for all types of games in 2010. Delaware only allowed
for slot machines in 1994, as did Pennsylvania in 2006. Both of these states also legalized table
games in 2010.
The numbers of hotel rooms and fine dining outlets were collected from property
websites and calls to front desk agents. The gaming tax rates are publicly available through state
regulatory agencies. The states’ demographic data are 2014 estimates from the US census
bureau.
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Table 1
Tax Rates and Amenities in Selected States
Pennsylvania
Harrah's Philadelphia
Nemacolin Woodlands Resort
The Meadows
Mohegan Sun
Mt. Airy
Parx
Hollywood
Presque Isle Downs
Rivers Casino
Sands Bethlehem
Sugar House
Valley Forge
Total
PA (Planned)
Philadelphia Live
Maryland
Rocky Gap Casino Resort
Horseshoe Baltimore
Hollywood Casino
Maryland Live
Ocean Downs
Total
MD (Planned)
MGM National Harbor
Delaware
Delaware Park
Dover Downs
Harrington Raceway
Total

Hotel Rooms
0
343
0
476
187
0
0
0
0
302
0
486
1794

220
Hotel Rooms
198
0
0
0
0
198

308
Hotel Rooms
0
500
0
500

Fine Dining
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
18

Effective Gaming Tax Rate
Slots:55% Tables:14%
Population
12,787,209
Median Household Income
$53,046

6 total
restaurants
Fine Dining
1
1
0
1
0
3

Effective Gaming Tax Rate
Slots:67% Tables:20%
Population
5,976,406
Median Household Income
$73,537

12 total
restaurants
Fine Dining
1
2
1
4

Note: Data drawn from commonly available public sources
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Effective Gaming Tax Rate
Slots:56% Tables:33.9%
Population
935,613
Median Household Income
$59,877
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